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A COMMENT ON UNIFICATION
Grayson M.P. McCouch*
Editors' Synopsis: This Article discusses recent proposals aimed at
unifying the law of wills and nonprobate transfers. The author notes that
default rules of construction present the strongest case for unification, but
contends that distinctions between wills and nonprobate transfers remain
important in the areas offormalities and restrictions affecting third-party
rights. The author concludes that the policy goal should be to allow wills
and nonprobate transfers to operate smoothly as complementary methods
of deathtime wealth transmission.
Ira Bloom raises interesting and provocative questions concerning the
relationship between wills and revocable trusts in the context of federal
estate tax apportionment.' His main focus is not on specific methods of
apportioning the burden of the estate tax but rather on the means by which
a transferor can direct a scheme of apportionment that departs from the
default rules of state and federal law. His central premise is that a trans-
feror's intent should be respected, whether that intent is expressed in a
will or a revocable trust. He vigorously criticizes the disparate treatment
of wills and revocable trusts under current law and proposes a statutory
approach that would give controlling effect to apportionment directions in
a transferor's most recently executed will or revocable trust.2
Although Bloom's discussion focuses on specific problems of federal
estate tax apportionment, his proposal can and should be viewed in a
broader context. Bloom's call for equal treatment of wills and revocable
trusts echoes the case for a "unified law of succession" advanced by John
Langbein in an influential 1984 article analyzing the origins and implica-
tions of the "nonprobate revolution."3 Langbein's basic insight is that
Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I am grateful to the University
of San Diego School of Law for generous research support.
1 See Ira Mark Bloom, Unifying the Rules for Wills and Revocable Trusts in the
Federal Estate Tax Apportionment Arena: Suggestions for Reform, 43 REAL PROP. TR. &
EST. L.J. 447 (2008), originally printed in 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767 (2008).
2 See id. at 496-97 ("I would propose a federal statute that allows revocable trusts to
do exactly what can be done under a will in changing a state's default rules .... My
bright-line rule would simply provide that the latest instrument controls, treating the latest
will or revocable trust as expressing the decedent's final intent."); see also id. at 496
(proposing a federal statute that would resolve choice of law issues in favor of the
decedent's domicile in matters of apportionment).
3 John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1108, 1109 (1984) (noting the possibility of a "unified law
500 43 REAL PROPERTY, TRUST AND ESTATE LAW JOURNAL
revocable trusts and other will substitutes are functionally indistinguish-
able from wills; they perform the will-like function of transferring prop-
erty at death, but they generally do so outside the probate system and
without having to comply with wills formalities. Indeed, he describes will
substitutes as "nonprobate wills" and argues that they should presump-
tively be subject to the same rules of construction as wills. 4 Langbein's
analysis deserves close attention, for it furnishes the conceptual founda-
tion for Bloom's proposal as well as for several comprehensive reform
projects that share the common goal of "unifying the law of wills and will
substitutes."5
In setting forth the rationale for unification, Langbein focuses primar-
ily on default rules of construction, which he refers to as "subsidiary"
rules.6 The case for equal treatment of wills and will substitutes in this
area is fairly obvious and straightforward. Default rules of construction
generally seek to carry out an ordinary transferor's intent and, unlike
mandatory rules, yield to evidence of contrary intent. To the extent
transferors use wills and will substitutes interchangeably, they presumably
intend identical language in different instruments to be interpreted consis-
tently and gap-filling rules of construction to apply uniformly to both
types of instruments. As it happens, the law of wills provides a compre-
hensive and well-developed body of constructional rules which can
readily be expanded or adapted to apply to will substitutes concerning
matters such as survival, lapse, and divorce. It is hardly surprising, then,
that the goal of uniform constructional rules commands broad consensus
among reformers.'
of succession").
4 Id. at 1137 ("Once we understand that will substitutes are nothing more than
'nonprobate wills' and that no harm results from admitting that truth, we have no basis for
interpreting will substitutes differently from wills. Both as a matter of legislative policy
and as a principle of judicial construction, we should aspire to uniformity in the subsidiary
rules for probate and nonprobate transfers.").
5RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2
cmt. a (2003) (noting that the same policy goal is reflected in the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts, the Uniform Probate Code, and the Uniform Trust Code).
6 Langbein, supra note 3, at 1134-40. I am grateful to Professor Langbein for
clarifying this point of terminology.
See; UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 1I, Prefatory Note, 8 U.L.A. (pt. 1) 75 (1998);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 (2003);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 (1998); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112, 7C U.L.A. 453
(2006).
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By contrast, as Langbein recognizes, the rationale for unification does
not apply to mandatory rules concerning the formalities of will execu-
tion.' A moment's reflection reveals why this is so. Execution formalities
play a crucial role in distinguishing wills from will substitutes; wills
generally must be executed with prescribed statutory formalities, while
will substitutes are subject to alternative--often less stringent-formali-
ties. 9 More importantly, the formal line between wills and will substitutes
also marks the boundary between probate and nonprobate transfers;
property transferred by will (or by intestate succession) is generally
subject to probate administration, while property transferred by will
substitute passes outside the probate system.1 ° Langbein is undoubtedly
correct that with the rise of will substitutes the probate system itself has
become essentially a default method for transferring property at death. 1
This does not mean, however, that the formal distinction between wills
and will substitutes has become unimportant. Indeed, will substitutes must
be clearly distinguishable from wills if they are to succeed in their pri-
mary goal of carrying out deathtime transfers without becoming entangled
in costly, protracted, and burdensome court proceedings.
The rationale for unification becomes more complicated in the area of
mandatory restrictions that protect the rights of third parties. In principle,
proponents of unification agree that a transferor should not be able to use
will substitutes to defeat a surviving spouse's elective share or creditors'
claims.' 2 Accordingly, the Uniform Probate Code allows a decedent's
surviving spouse and creditors to look beyond the probate estate and
reach nonprobate assets to satisfy their respective claims. In the case of
the spouse's elective share, liability is apportioned more or less ratably
among other beneficiaries of probate and nonprobate transfers, 3 while in
8 See Langbein, supra note 3, at 1139 (noting "intrinsic limit" of unified approach).
9See id. at 1130-32 (discussing concept of "alternative formality").
10 See id. at 1129 ("The Wills Act tells us what formalities are necessary to effect a
probate transfer[.]"); id. at 1140 ("American law has defined testation and probate in
terms of each other[.]").
11 See id. at 1132 ("The real state of the law is that the transferor may choose to pass
his property on death in either the probate or the nonprobate system or in both.").
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 7.2 cmts. a, b, g (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmts. d, e (2003).
13 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-209, 8 U.L.A. (pt. ) 122 (1998). The elective share
is satisfied first from amounts passing to or already owned by the surviving spouse, Only
if those amounts are insufficient are other beneficiaries liable for the deficiency, and
liability is apportioned ratably except for two narrow categories of transfers occurring
during marriage and within two years before death. See id.
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the case of creditors' claims, nonprobate assets can be reached only if the
probate estate is insolvent. 14 These provisions highlight a major functional
limitation of nonprobate transfers. To enforce a right of contribution
against nonprobate assets, the spouse or creditor must invoke the proce-
dural machinery of the probate system. Effective enforcement requires an
orderly, centralized process to determine the amounts of various claims,
classify them in order of priority, and identify the assets available to pay
them. The probate system is uniquely suited to perform this function and
therefore plays an indispensable role in protecting the rights of third
parties. By contrast, nonprobate transfers flourish precisely because they
provide no comparable protection. As Langbein observes, nonprobate
transfers "execute easy transfers and shunt the hard ones over to
probate."''
5
In apportioning federal estate tax liability, the general concept of
equitable apportionment seems fully compatible with the rationale for
unification.1 6 It is less clear, however, how a transferor's specific appor-
tionment directions in a will or revocable trust should be treated. Bloom
advocates identical treatment for apportionment directions in both types
of instruments. 7 This full-parity approach can be defended as a robust
application of the rationale for unification, but it raises a problem con-
cerning execution formalities. As a general matter, it may be reasonable to
presume that an apportionment direction or beneficiary designation in an
existing will substitute can be amended or revoked by a subsequent will,
unless the will substitute provides to the contrary. 8 (Of course, many will
substitutes expressly prohibit amendment or revocation by will in order to
14 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-102 (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. (pt. I), 184-85
(Supp. 2008); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505, 7C U.L.A. 534-35 (2006).
16 Langbein, supra note 3, at 1120.
16 See id. at 1138 ("The law governing the apportionment of estate taxes between
probate and nonprobate assets has been moving strongly toward equal treatment of the
See Bloom, supra note 1, at 448-49 ("[T]rue unification in the area of federal
estate tax apportionment will be achieved only when American law places the revocable
trust device, the functional equivalent of a will, on par with wills in terms of a decedent's
abilitto change default apportionment rules.").
See Langbein, supra note 3, at 1138-39; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63
cmt. h (2003); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101, 8 U.L.A. (pt. IU) 430 (1998); UNI. TRUST
CODE § 602(c) (amended 2003), 7C U.L.A. 546-47 (2006). This presumption is not
universally accepted, however. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. e (2003); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-213(b) (amended
1995), 8 U.L.A. (pt. 11) 441 (1998).
A Comment on Unification 503
avoid becoming entangled in probate proceedings at the transferor's
death.) The real difficulty arises in the reverse situation. An attempt to
amend or revoke an existing will by a subsequent will substitute is likely
to fail if it does not comply with statutory wills formalities. 9 Although
Bloom does not address this point, his argument that a revocable trust
should be effective to alter apportionment directions in a prior will in
effect calls for an implied special-purpose exception to the wills formali-
ties.
Wills formalities do not necessarily preclude a revocable trust from
modifying apportionment directions contained in a prior will.2" In some
cases, it may be possible to avoid a direct conflict with wills formalities if
the new apportionment direction reduces the tax burden on the probate
estate. For example, suppose an existing will directs payment of the
federal estate tax from the residuary probate estate without apportion-
ment, and a subsequent revocable trust directs payment of the tax from the
trust property. The new apportionment direction may be valid if it is
viewed not as an (invalid) attempt to amend the prior will but rather as a
pourover gift to the residuary devisees, in accordance with its substantive
effect. Apart from wills formalities, some jurisdictions impose limits on
the use of revocable trusts to achieve wholesale shifting of tax burdens.
For example, a provision in a revocable trust directing payment from the
trust property of the tax attributable to the trust may be effective to mod-
ify an inconsistent direction in a prior will, while a provision purporting
to exonerate the trust property from all tax liability may be ineffective.
Bloom apparently rejects any approach that does not treat wills and
revocable trusts identically. Although he confines his discussion to the
treatment of apportionment directions in wills and revocable trusts, his
concept of unification could have far-reaching consequences if extended
to other types of will substitutes or to areas other than federal estate tax
apportionment.
Bloom's proposal provides a welcome opportunity to review the
rationale for unification as an organizing principle for current law reform
efforts. 2' In seeking to unify the law of wills and will substitutes, reform-
19 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507, 8 U.L.A. (pt. 1) 151-52 (1998) (requiring a
"subsequent will" or "revocatory act"). Arguably, the attempt might be salvaged under a
statutory dispensing power. See id. § 2-503.20 Cf. UNIF. ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT § 3(a) (2003), 8A U.L.A. 137 (Supp.
2008% (giving categorical priority to directions in a will over directions in will substitutes).
See Grayson M.P. McCouch, Probate Law Reform and Nonprobate Transfers, 62
U. MIAMI L. REV. 757 (2008).
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ers should recognize that unification is an abstract concept, not a self-
defining policy prescription. Will substitutes come in many different
forms; they rely on diverse mechanisms to transfer property at death; and
they have evolved and proliferated largely in response to real or perceived
shortcomings of the probate system. In some respects will substitutes are
functionally indistinguishable from wills and the rationale for unification
is correspondingly strong, as in the area of default rules of construction.
In other respects, however, there are real differences which may justify
disparate treatment of wills and will substitutes. Execution formalities, for
example, play a crucial role in marking the boundary between wills and
will substitutes, between probate and nonprobate transfers. Protecting the
rights of third parties, such as spouses and creditors, may justify invoking
the procedural safeguards of the probate system and limiting the advan-
tages of probate avoidance. The same is true of federal estate tax appor-
tionment, which requires a centralized forum to identify the beneficiaries
of probate and nonprobate transfers, compute the values of their respec-
tive interests and their shares of the tax, and enforce rights of contribution
against them. To reduce the likelihood of confusion arising from inconsis-
tent directions in multiple will substitutes, it may be reasonable to estab-
lish an order of priority among wills, revocable trusts, and other will
substitutes. The rationale for unification does not require the obliteration
of all distinctions between wills and will substitutes. Instead, the policy
goal should be to allow probate and nonprobate transfers to operate
smoothly as complementary methods within the expanding universe of
deathtime transfers.
